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Abstract. The ISO/IEC 61850 protocol for substation automation is a key com-
ponent for the safe and efficient operation of smart grids, whilst offering a sub-
stantial range of functions. While extension standards, particularly ISO/IEC 62351
provide further security controls, the baseline protocol offers the assurances of ac-
cess control and availability. In this paper a systematic study of selected aspects
of the basic ISO/IEC 61850 protocol demonstrates that protocol-level vulnerabil-
ities exist. The main finding is the development of a credential interception attack
allowing an adversary, without credentials, to hijack a session during an initial
association; the feasibility of this attack is proven using a formal language repre-
sentation. A second attack based on a workflow amplification attack which relies
on the assumptions in the protocol’s substation event model, which is indepen-
dent of layered security controls and only relies on the protocol’s communication
patterns is shown.
Keywords: Smart Grid, ISO/IEC 61850, Access Control, Amplification Attack,
Substation Automation Protocol
1 Introduction
Smart grid technologies allow for more flexible generation and demand coordination
whilst reducing costs with their greater bidirectional communication and control re-
quirements [24]. However, this technological advancement degrades the “air gap” se-
curity principle that has been used in the power systems engineering community for
the past few decades. The addition of networked intelligent electronic devices to the
existing distribution infrastructure makes security through the obscurity of supervisory
control and data acquisition (SCADA) protocols untenable, particularly since networks
are increasingly interacting with internet protocols which is substantially increasing the
attack surface.
Attacks against cyber-physical systems, such as electrical distribution networks, in
recent history have shown that the threat is no longer a theoretical one. Whether it
is a direct attack against the industrial control systems itself [7], or an attempt to re-
move the ability to control as in the case of Shamoon [19], or to manipulate control as
seen with BlackEnergy3 [21], comprehensive strategies are needed to protect critical
infrastructure systems. Whilst both the academic and industrial research communities
are now focusing on solving the unique security challenges faced in the deployment of
smart grid technologies, there is very little focus dedicated to checking if the security
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promises made by the various smart grid protocols hold true. Having a secured protocol
could prevent some of the theorised attacks against smart grids.
The following analysis focuses on the limited security objectives that are explicitly
stated in IEC61850. These are access control and accessibility. It does not look at the
objectives defined in IEC 62351, the protocol which is designed to extended the security
specified of the information network controlling a smart grid’s substation automation.
The key contribution of this paper is to show that these explicit objectives are not up-
held. A credential intercept attack against the protocol’s two party association model
is proved, through the use of context-free grammar, which undermines access control.
It is also shown that the generic substation event model can be used against the smart
grid’s information network. A workflow amplification attack is shown, by example, to
create the conditions to deny the flow of packets across communications infrastructure.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the related
work in the field. Section 3 then describes the aforementioned attacks against IEC61850,
before giving conclusions and a sketch of future work in section 4.
2 Related Work
Research into the cyber-physical security of power grids has been under way for over
a decade, starting with North American Electric Reliability Corporation published its
Critical Infrastructure Protection Cyber Security Standards [1]. However, there has been
limited research into the specific threats facing individual protocols. There are plenty
of taxonomies of attacks against general smart grid technologies [8,15,25,27], but only
since 2010 have there been taxonomies focusing on specific attacks against IEC61850
[5, 17, 18]. Most of the theorised attacks against smart grids are either derivatives of
computer network exploits, or an infiltration into the smart grid’s information network
via compromising the affiliated corporate network. Most taxonomies put forward so-
lutions for there proposed attacks based upon their computer network counter parts,
without considering if it will conflict with the quality of service requirements of the
protocols. For example to validate the authenticity of the packets passing through the
computer network, IEC62351 recommends using asymmetrical encryption schemes.
However, as this comes into conflict with the latency requirements for packets declared
in IEC61850, IEC62351 states “for applications using GOOSE and IEC 61850-9-2 and
requiring 4ms response times, multicast configurations and low CPU overhead, encryp-
tion is not recommended” [11].
There has been some research directly focusing on attacks using IEC61850’s generic
object oriented substation events (GOOSE) multicast messaging service. Hoyos et al.
proposed a GOOSE spoofing attack where the adversary injects malicious copies of le-
gitimate packets, but with the values in the data sets switched [6]. The aim of their attack
is to get an intelligent electronic device to perform an undesirable action, like tripping
a circuit breaker, by providing it with incorrect information. Another GOOSE attack
authored by Kush et al.. They developed a denial of service attack using the GOOSE
status number variable [9]. In this attack the adversary injects a GOOSE message with
a higher status number than all the legitimate GOOSE messages on the network. This
forces the intelligent electronic device to process this malicious message before any
legitimate ones.
Substantial efforts have been made to analyse and secure the older DNP3 protocol.
Although it was designed to be a SCADA protocol that could be applied across the
general spectrum of critical infrastructure, proposals have been made to use it in the
substation automation space. East et al. published a taxonomy of attacks against DNP3,
which specifically distinguishing how traditional network attacks can be applied against
different abstraction layers of the communications network [4]. They also proposed the
use of the security promises of awareness and control for SCADA systems. Mander et
al. developed a system to extend the traditional IP security applied to DNP3, by creating
a set of rules that are based upon DNP3’s data objects to make sure that only legitimate
packets flow across the network [14].
Finite state machines have been used to validate the general promises of commu-
nications protocols for decades [2]; however, they have only recently been applied to
security promises. Poll and Rutiter used automata, along with black box fuzzing tech-
niques, to show that session languages are usually poorly defined leading to vulnerabil-
ities [16]. Wood and Harang proposed a framework for using formal language theory
to secure protocols, as it is better at defining the data transiting between points of a
network[26].
The use of context-free grammars has been applied to various aspect of the secu-
rity theatre. Sassaman et al. used context-free grammars and pushdown automata to
create a framework for a language based intrusion detection systems [20]. Liu et al.
used probabilistic context-free grammar to prove that an adversary could impersonate
authentication server in a Point-to-Point Protocol over Ethernet protocol [10].
3 Attack Taxonomy
Below the attacks against IEC61850 that serve to invalidate its stated security objec-
tives are described. It is assumed throughout that the attacks are instigated on a reliable
communications channel that are implemented on a network substrate, such as IP.
3.1 An Attack on Access Control: Credential Intercept Attack
The first security promise that was analysed was access control. This is proposed in
IEC61850-5[13], as a solution to denial of service attacks against the communication
infrastructure of the grid. During the investigation it was found that an attack against
two party association model, described in IEC61850-7-2 section 8.3, undermines this
promise [12].
An adversary, who has no login credentials on the network, is able to hijack the
login credentials of legitimate user whilst they are logging into their logical node server
view. This attack can be perpetrated against a client that is logging into the logical
node for the first time, or who hasn’t already been given a predetermined authentication
parameter. This scenario is predicated on the adversary doing some passive surveillance
of the communications network, as the two party association model is only instigated
when a new entity is connected to the it. Once this precondition is fulfilled the attacker
is able to proceed with the attack.
The Two Party Association Model The two party association model describes how a
client program can connect and transfer packets with a logical node server view. The
standard procedure for the model is that the client sends an access request, shortened to
Acc−Req(SA/AP), message to a virtual view on the logical node server, LN. Included
within the request are the client’s login credentials, which includes an authentication
parameter, AP, and the server access point reference, SA.
Once the server has received this request, it then decides how to proceed. If the
client’s login credentials are correct then the server will reply to the client with an
affirmative message, Acc−R+(AID/Re) , that will include an authentication ID, AID,
and the result of the attempt, Re. However, if the client’s login credentials are invalid
then the server will reply in the negative, Acc−R−(Err), with an error message, Err.
Client LN server view
Acc−Req(SA/AP)
Acc−R+(AID/Re)
(a) The logical nodes affirmative response
Client LN server view
Acc−Req(Invalid SA/AP)
Acc−R−(Err)
(b) The logical nodes negative response
Fig. 1: Session diagram depicting the two party association model.
The Adversary Model The adversary in the this scenario is based on upon the one
described by the Dolev-Yao model[3]. This adversary is constrained by the following
requirements:-
– The adversary can see all packets passing between the client and the LN server
– The adversary cannot send any message that they have not already seen.
– The adversary has no buffer on messages they have seen. They have to send the
message directly after seeing it.
– The adversary can forward and intercept packets.
Whilst there are some similarities, the reason that this model doesn’t duplicate the
Dolev-Yao model is the protocol being attacked is a SCADA protocol rather than a
cryptographic one.
The Attack premise The attack happens by combining the two potential responses of
the server into one session. It begins when the client sends a legitimate login request
to their own virtual view of the LN server. The adversary sees the client’s packet go
through their intercept and then sends a invalid login attempt to their own server view.
When the client’s view responds in the affirmative with the authentication ID, the ad-
versary intercepts this packet. When the adversary’s view replies in the negative, the
adversary forwards the packet with the error message to the client. After this the client
cannot use their login credentials.
Client Attacker LN server view 1 LN server view 2
Acc−Req(SA/AP)
Acc−Req(Invalid SA/AP)
Acc−R+(AID/Re)
Acc−R−(Err)
Fig. 2: Session diagram of the proposed attack.
The Automata [22] Figures 3 and 4 depict the automaton modelling the process of one
client logging in, and the union of two one client automata to form one that can model
two users logging in simultaneously. The two user automaton allows the depiction of
the attack described in the previous section. In the two person automaton S represents
the standby state, C represents the check state, and A represents the awaiting state.
Standbystart Check
Accept
Reject
Awaiting
Acc−Req()
SA
/A
P
Invalid SA/AP
Acc−R+(AID/Re)
Acc−R−(Err)
Fig. 3: The automaton depicting one client logging into a logical node server.
The Context Free Grammar The rules that describe a legitimate message that passes
through the two person automaton are as follows:-
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Fig. 4: The automaton depicting two clients logging into a logical node server simulta-
neously.
– A login attempt for one access view must be completed before a second login can
be attempted.
– There can only be two successful attempts per run of the automaton.
– An infinite number of failed attempts can be made before the first successful mes-
sage and between the first and final successful message.
The following rules describe the form of the message that can pass through the two
person automaton that leads to an undesired result:-
– The adversary can only duplicate a message that has passed their intercept.
– The adversary’s duplicate message can only be sent immediately after seeing it.
They have no buffer.
– The adversary’s ‘Acc−Req()’ must come before the client’s ‘AP/SA’ is processed
by their login view.
– The adversary can only send invalid SA/AP credentials. This is to make sure it ends
up in the state they desire (S1A2 or A1S2)
– The legitimate user cannot login after the attacker has intercepted their credentials.
The objective of the adversary is to make sure that the automaton is driven through the
C1C2 state. This collision state represents the adversary’s intercept where they hijack
the authentication ID and forward their error message.
The context free grammar that represent the above rules are as follows:-
S→ TATV |TWTW |TV |TW
R→ Acc−Req()
V → Invalid SA/AP Acc−R−(Err)
W → SA/AP Acc−R+(AID/Re)
T → RU
U →V T |ε
A→W |RVW |RWV
Mapping to IEC61850-7-2 The above grammar maps to the two party association
model in the following way:
– Rule S: Presents the four different message types. From left to right.
1. Is the comprised attack form. If the attack is not attempted this leads to n = 0...
failed attempts, followed by a successful login and then another n = 0... failed
logins. However if rule inserts either ‘rVW ’ or ‘RWV ’ instead of ‘W ’, then
the undesired form of the message begins. This leads to two ‘Acc− Req()’
messages in a row. They can both be seen as undesired as the attacker controls
all messages passing through its intercept.
2. A word with two successful logins with n = 0... failed messages before the first
and between the subsequent successful logins.
3. n = 0... failed logins.
4. n = 0... failed logins followed by one successful message.
– Rule R: Maps to the request message parameter.
– Rule V : Maps to the incorrect form of 8.3.2.2.2.1, the server access point refer-
ence, and 8.3.2.2.2.2, the authentication parameter. Followed by 8.3.2.2.5, response
showing the failed attempt error, which “shall indicate that the service request
failed”.
– Rule W : Maps to the correct form of 8.3.2.2.2.1, the server access point reference,
“which shall identify the server, with which the application association shall be
established”, and 8.3.2.2.2.2, the authentication parameter, “for this application
association to be opened”. Followed by 8.3.2.2.3, response showing the successful
login returning the authentication ID, which “may be used to differentiate the ap-
plication associations”, and request message, which indicates ”if the establishment
of the application association was successful or not”.
– Rule T : Is the rule that facilitates the n = 0... repeats of the failed login, or it
provides an ‘Acc−Req()’ packet before terminating the loop.
– Rule U : Provides the terminals to facilitate rule ‘T ’.
– Rule A: Is the production rule for the attack. From left to right.
1. Facilitates the normal success message stuck between to infinite failed attempts.
2. Two ‘Acc−Req()’ packets followed by a failed login attempt and then a suc-
cessful login.
3. Like 2, but the error and success messages are reversed.
2 and 3 are the undesired message forms
The above shows that the security promise of access control does not hold for the
two party association model.
3.2 An Attack on Availability: Generic Workflow Event Amplification Attack
The second security promise that was analysed was that of availability of service. This
promise is proposed in IEC61850-5 section 13 as the general message performance
requirements. During the investigation it was found that an attack using the generic
substation event class model, as described in IEC61850-7-2 section 15, could be used
to create a denial of service of attack to undermine this promise.
The aim of the adversary in this scenario is to degrade the performance of packet trans-
fer between points on the smart grid topology to below the acceptable standard. The
adversary achieves this by sending messages that connects additional subscribers or
topological branches to a LN’s generic substation event subscriber list. This leads to
the routers and LNs on the network having to process, and potentially discard, extra
messages. Whilst the analysis allows for the calculation of the number of extra bits pro-
cessed by the grid, it doesn’t cover the additional latency. This is due to the amount of
time for a computation to take place on a LN being beyond the scope of IEC61850.
This analysis assumes that generic substation event model has been implemented on
PIM multicast framework that has been applied to a network substrate that supports it.
The Generic Substation Event Class Model The generic substation event class model
describes the way a LN can broadcast data regarding its current, or changing, status to
the devices that subscribe to its announcements. It is based on a producer/subscriber
multicast model, and is implemented as an unidirectional process. There are two types
of message in this model. Firstly, the GOOSE message, that is used to broadcast the
LN’s data, and the second is the generic substation state events (GSSE) message, which
broadcasts any changes in state. When a LN is connected to the network it sends a
GOOSE message that announces to devices its current status.
A LN on a generic substation event network will only check to see if the message it
has received is a duplicate of a previous message, or if parts of it are missing. The
method used to check for this is, again, beyond the scope IEC61850. In this analysis it
is assumed that the logical node does not have access to the complete address space of
the network and the packets received aren’t cryptographically signed.
PIM multicast[23] In PIM sparse mode when a receiver issues a join request to be
added to the network, a reverse path forwarding (RPF)check is triggered. A PIM-join
message is sent toward rendezvous point (RP), in Figure 5a that is D. The join message
is multicast hop by hop upstream to the all the PIM routers until it reaches the RP. The
RP router receives the PIM-join message and adds it to the outgoing interface list. The
same process is done for when a router wishes to leave the network, but instead sends a
PIM-prune message. When a source is added, it multicasts a PIM-register message and
sends them by means of unicast to the RP router.
In PIM dense mode the outgoing interface list is created by the source sending out a
PIM-flood message periodically. This registers all devices on the network to the list. If
a receiver no longer wishes to be on the list, it sends a PIM-prune message upstream to
the source, which then removes it from the list. If a new receiver wishes to join before
the next PIM-flood, they can send a PIM-graft message to the source to be added.
Source 1
A B D F Source 2
C E
Receiver 1 Receiver 2
(a) A sparse topology.
Source 1
A B
C D F
G
HEReceiver 1 I
Receiver 2 Receiver 3
(b) A dense topology.
Fig. 5: Examples of PIM multicast system topology.[23]
The Adversary Model The adversary model is the same as the one described in section
3.1, however this adversary has a buffer so they are not required to send messages they
have discerned straight away.
The Attack premise The attack is predicated on the adversary performing some pas-
sive surveillance on the communications network. Through the adversary’s observation
they decide which branch or LN they which to attach to the LN’s subscriber list, and
which type of PIM network it is. They also discern the logical node’s specific appli-
cation ID, which is required for subscribers to receive the GOOSE messages. The ad-
versary sends either a PIM-flood or PIM-graft, for dense PIM networks), or PIM-join
or PIM-register for sparse PIM-networks. The next time the publisher LN sends out a
generic substation event message to the network the LNs that have been maliciously
subscribed to the network will receive messages they weren’t expecting. As they have
no access to the address space they cannot tell whether they were meant to receive the
message.
The Workflow Amplification factor The workflow amplification factor describes the
ratio of messages produced to messages the adversary sent to initiate the attack in the
number of bits.
Amplification factor =
Message produced as a consequence of the attack
Messages sent by the adversary
(1)
The amplification factor for a GOOSE message is,
Amplification factorGOOSE =
A+ length of data set+data set
B+C
, (2)
where is A = 187, B = 65, and C = 4or32 depending on whether the adversary chooses
to edit the PIM message type, or create a new PIM message.
For a GSSE,
Amplification factorGSSE =
D+(2∗ length of data set)
B+C
, (3)
where D = 170
Examples Below are example calculations given for the workflow amplification factor
for an adversary instigating the attack from various points in the networks depicted in
figures 5a and 5b. All of the below examples takes the average number of status logical
node variables, which is three, as the length of the data set. As the status variables
are usually a boolean variable type, it is assumed for these calculations that they are
boolean. For the purpose of these examples the adversary will create a whole new PIM
message for their attack.
AFGOOSE AFGSSE
Case 1 3.96 3.63
Case 2 23.75 22.14
Case 3 11.87 11.07
Case 1 is set in the depicted dense PIM network. In this case the adversary has chosen
to connect router I to the network, so to send malicious messages to Receiver 3. Case 2
is when the adversary connects a new source to the network.
Case 3 is the attack scenario applied to the sparse PIM network example. In this instance
the adversary connects source 2 to the network to send malicious messages to both
Reciever 1 and Receiver 2. In the case of adding another receiver to the network, the
amplification factor would be the same as case 1.
4 Conclusion
The above analysis has shown that the explicit security promises of IEC61850 are not
upheld throughout the protocol’s technical specification. A credential intercept attack
has been developed and proved using context-free grammar against the two party asso-
ciation model. This attack undermines the promise of access control, and would allow
the adversary to potentially completely control a logical node if the they intercepted
someone with administrative privileges. This scenario would allow them to cause phys-
ical damage to the smart grid, for example they could trip circuit breakers and cause
undue stress on the distribution network. The second attack developed undermined the
security promise of accessibility. It was shown by example that a workflow amplifica-
tion type denial of service attack could be instigated against an intelligent electronic
device by an adversary generating a malicious message that would connect the target
node to a GOOSE subscriber list that it did not want to receive messages from. The
denial of service comes from the intelligent electronic device having to process more
messages than it was expecting. The scale of the amplification factor of the attack is
proportional to the number of nodes and routers that have to process the extra malicious
messages.
Although the attacks mentioned above are limited to IEC61850, there is a reasonable
likelihood that other smart grid protocols, such as DNP3, will also be found deficient
when upholding their security promises. The above methodologies can be used to per-
form the same analysis on these protocols to develop, and attempt to mitigate, such
attacks.
Progressing onwards from the above analysis the intention is to see if there are any
other protocol models that contain flaws that would undermine the security promises
we have access to. The next vector of attack that has been considered is to see if we
can get a client and/or the logical node server to be uncertain what state it is in due
to an interruption in the communication channel. It is hoped that it will be possible to
formally verify theses future attacks with a context-free grammar approach
Once this line of inquiry has been exhausted, the focus of the investigation will proceed
to see if the attacks that have been discovered can still be executed when IEC62351 has
been used to secure IEC61850.
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